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A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
Abstract
The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics
predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior
is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of
change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and
increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for
(i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response
equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection
concepts.
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1 Introduction
Laboratory experiments have cast doubt on the predictive value of the Nash
equilibrium and its refinements. At least the joint hypothesis that monetary
payoffs are maximized and the Nash equilibrium is played is often in conflict
with the facts.1 Nevertheless, as argued by Samuelson (2005), even when
point predictions do not hold, comparative statics predictions may still be
borne out in the lab.2 However, in an insightful contribution, Goeree and Holt
(2001), henceforth GH, report the results of ten pairs of experiments where
the Nash equilibrium is the same in both cases, but nevertheless subjects
behave differently. Thus, not only the point predictions are wrong, but even
the comparative statics implication that behavior should not be affected by
the parameter change fails to hold.
This paper presents a unified explanation of the treatment effects in sev-
eral GH puzzles, without making any attempt to provide point predictions.3 I
start from the simple observation that 6 of the 10 pairs of experiments ana-
lyzed by GH share important structural properties. First, for suitable partial
orders on strategy spaces they are games with strategic complementarities
(GSC): Both players’ best responses are weakly increasing in the actions of
the other player. Second, increasing differences (ID) holds: In one of the
treatments (H), for each initial strategy profile, the incremental payoff from
increasing the own action is weakly higher than in the other one (L). These
1For instance, subjects only rely on iterated elimination of dominated strategies to a
limited extent (Beard and Beil 1994). Deviations from the Nash prediction also occur
in games where social preferences matter, including public goods games (Ledyard 1995),
ultimatum games (Güth et al. 1982) and trust games (Fehr et al. 1993).
2Samuelson himself points out the limitations of his statement, mentioning bargaining
experiments of Ochs and Roth (1989) where the effects of the discount factor and the
length of the game are inconsistent with standard predictions.
3GH provide various possible explanations for some of the observed deviations from
Nash behavior, for instance, social preferences, maximin behavior, and a noisy theory of
introspection. Related papers explain similar phenomena using selection theories based on
risk dominance and potential maximization (Anderson et al. 2001 and Goeree and Holt
2005).
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two properties combined give a clear intuition why players are likely to choose
higher actions in H than in L. First, because incremental payoffs are higher in
H than in L, incentives to increase actions are higher in H for fixed behavior
of the other player. Second, if players accordingly believe that the opponents
will choose higher actions in game H, this reinforces the tendency to choose
high actions by GSC. Based on these two structural properties of the game,
it is therefore intuitive to predict that actions are weakly higher for H than
for L, even though direct calculation of Nash equilibria predicts no change.
The direction of change in the six GH puzzles satisfying strategic com-
plementarities (SC) and ID is always predicted correctly in this fashion. In
addition, a similar structure-based prediction in another GH example that
is not a GSC is confirmed by the data.4 In the remaining three cases, this
heuristic structural approach does not yield the wrong predictions. It is not
applicable, because the games are too complex to allow for comparative sta-
tics results that are based purely on the structural properties of the game.
The very fact that the structural approach is intuitive and provides correct
predictions for 7 out of 10 GH examples (andmany other similar experiments)
might be regarded as a sufficient justification for its use. Nevertheless, I offer
several possible foundations. All these foundations build from a well-known
monotone comparative statics results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and
Vives (1990), according to which the Nash equilibrium of a parameterized
GSC satisfying ID is weakly increasing in the parameter.5 In addition, they
provide reasons why the equilibrium might increase strictly in the parameter.
First, I suppose that players are not playing according to the monetary
payoffs, but instead have payoffs resulting from a perturbation of monetary
payoffs (for instance, because of social preferences). The perturbation does
not have to be small, as long as it does not destroy the basic structural
properties. Then, the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game satisfies the
4This example (generalized matching pennies) is not a GSC, but is simple because the
parameter only enters the payoffs of one player.
5These results state more generally that the smallest and largest Nash equilibrium of
such games are weakly increasing in the parameter.
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weak comparative statics predicted by the structural approach.
Second, I consider the QRE of Mc Kelvey and Palfrey (1995), which does
not presuppose that players choose best responses to the expected behavior
of others, but allows for the possibility of errors. I show that it satisfies
the same weak comparative statics as the Nash equilibrium: In supermodu-
lar games satisfying ID, if the parameter increases, the equilibrium weakly
increases in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance if the error distribu-
tion is invariant under the parameter change. This is interesting because the
QRE has frequently been used to explain analogous observations in repeated
settings 6 ,7
Third, I consider level-k reasoning according to which some types of play-
ers (level-0 players) randomize, some types (level-1 players) best respond
agains level-0 players, some (level-2 players) best respond against level-1
players, and so on.8 Again, for supermodular games satisfying ID, level-k
reasoning leads to action profiles that are weakly increasing in the parame-
ter.
Finally, I show that, in symmetric games with ID and multiple parameter-
independent equilibria, the comparative statics predictions implied by equi-
librium selection via risk dominance or potential maximization are consistent
with the approach proposed here.
To sum up, several different theoretical approaches can all rationalize
existing comparative statics puzzles.9 This obviously makes it hard to dis-
criminate between these theories. However, it is good news in the sense that,
for an important class of games, we can quite confidently predict the direc-
tion of treatment effects, because the predictions can be based on a wide
6See Capra et al. (1999), Anderson et al. (2002), Goeree et al. (2003).
7Another promising approach to understanding the GH paradoxes was provided by
Eichberger and Kelsey (2007) who appeal to ambiguity aversion to explain the deviations
from equilibrium behavior.
8See, e.g., Stahl and Wilson (1995).
9In the working paper, I also discuss the relation to adjustment dynamics (see Milgrom
and Roberts 1990, Vives 1990, Milgrom and Shannon 1994, Echenique 2002).
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variety of different arguments.
While the results on the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game and
on equilibrium selection are very closely related to existing results, the com-
parative statics result for the QRE and for level-k reasoning are new and
hopefully interesting in their own right: They provide comparative statics
predictions for these concepts that hold independently of the calibration of
the underlying parameters.
In Section 2, I will sketch three of the GH examples. In Section 3, I
will introduce the structural approach as a heuristic. Sections 4, 5 and 6
relate the approach to the Nash equilibrium the QRE and level-k reasoning,
respectively. Section 7 discusses the relation to selection theories. Section 8
concludes.
2 Introductory examples
I shall first sketch three of the ten GH examples.
(i) In the Kreps game, players choose actions from X1 = {0, 1} and X2 =
{0, 1, 2, 3}, respectively. Table 1 gives payoffs, where θ ∈ R+.
x2 = 0 x2 = 1 x2 = 2 x2 = 3
x1 = 0 200, 50 0, 45 10, 30 20,−250
x1 = 1 0,−250 10,−100 30, 30 θ + 50, 65θ + 40
Table 1: Kreps Game
For all θ ∈ Θ, there are two pure Nash equilibria ((0, 0) and (1, 3)). In
addition, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium where player 1 chooses x1 = 0
with probability 30/31, and player 2 chooses x2 = 0 with probability 1/21
and x2 = 1 with probability 20/21. Thus, an increase of θ does not affect
the equilibrium structure. However, GH report the following results. For
θ = 0, 32% of the subjects in the role of player 1 chose the high action 1;
whereas 96% did so for θ = 300. For θ = 0, no subject in the role of player 2
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chose x2 = 3, but 84% did so for θ = 300. Thus, the experimental evidence
suggests that, as θ increases, more subjects choose high actions.
I am interested in this particular comparative statics observation of GH.10
One could of course explain it with selection arguments, based for instance on
payoff dominance. However, my goal is to find an explanation of treatment
effects that also applies to games with unique parameter-independent Nash
equilibria such as the following.
(ii) In the Traveler’s Dilemma,11 two players i = 1, 2 simultaneously
choose integers xi ∈ {180, ..., 300}. Each player is paid the minimum of
the chosen numbers; in addition, the player with the lower number receives a
transfer R > 1 from the player with the higher number. Therefore, defining
θ = −R,
πi (xi, xj; θ) = min (xi, xj) + θ · sign (xi − xj) . (1)
The dots on the lines in Figure 1 give the reaction functions for any
θ ∈ Θ = (−∞,−1). Thus, for all θ the game has a unique Nash equilibrium
x1 = x2 = 180.12 GH considered θ = −5 and θ = −180.13 For θ = −180, 80%
of the subjects chose actions between 180 (the minimum) and 185, whereas
80% choose actions between 295 and 300 (the maximum) for θ = −5. Thus,
as in the Kreps Game, even though the Nash equilibrium is independent of
θ, a parameter increase induces higher actions.
(iii) In the common-interest proposal game (GH, Figure 3), two players
move sequentially, according to the game tree in Figure 2.14 Thus, the strat-
egy spaces are X1 = X2 = {0, 1}. The parameter space is Θ = (0, 60). For
all θ ∈ Θ, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is x1 = x2 = 0. GH
considered θ = 0 and θ = 58. For θ = 0, 84% of the subjects in the role
10GH emphasize that for θ = 0 many subjects (68%) choose x2 = 2, the only action
that is neither part of a pure-strategy equilibrium nor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
11The game goes back to Basu (1994).
12This equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable strategy profile.
13Similar results have been obtained by Capra et al. (1999) for other parametrizations.
14I use the name “common-interest proposal game”, because (0, 0) is the optimal out-
come for both players.
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Figure 1: Traveler’s Dilemma
of player 1 and all the subjects in the role of player 2 chose the equilibrium
actions xi = 0. For θ = 58, however, the corresponding figures are only 46%
and 75% respectively. Hence, higher parameter values lead to higher actions.
Summing up, the following cases arise in the examples: (i) multiple pure-
strategy equilibria, (ii) a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, or (iii) a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In all the examples, however, the set of pure-
strategy equilibria is parameter-independent, but there are nevertheless clear
treatment effects.
3 The structural approach
I will now introduce the heuristic structural approach to predict treatment
effects even when the set of Nash equilibria is independent of treatments, as
in the above examples. To repeat, the approach makes no attempt to explain
why the observed play corresponds closely to the equilibrium in one case, but
not in the other; it merely predicts the direction of change in behavior across
treatments, not the relation to the equilibrium in any single experiment.
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Figure 2: A Common-Interest Proposal Game
3.1 Defining the structural approach
In all the examples, there are players i = 1, 2, strategy spaces Xi and payoff
functions πi(xi, xj, θ), where θ ∈ Θ, a partially ordered set, such that:
1. Xi is independent of θ;
2. Xi is a finite set;15
3. Xi is equipped with a partial order ≥ that is independent of θ, with
respect to which Xi forms a lattice.16
The following properties of the game are crucial.
Definition 1 (i) πi satifies increasing differences in (xi; θ),(ID), if
∆i
¡
xHi , x
L
i ;xj; θ
¢
≡ πi
¡
xHi , xj; θ
¢
− πi
¡
xLi , xj; θ
¢
15This assumption can be weakened considerably at the cost of greater technicalities. For
the purposes of interpreting the experimental evidence, the set-up is sufficiently general.
16A lattice requires that the infimum and supremum of each pair of elements exists in
Xi. In the following, the lattice structure will typically come from a complete order on a
finite set.
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is weakly increasing in θ, that is, ∆i
¡
xHi , xLi ;xj; θ
H¢ ≥ ∆i ¡xHi , xLi ;xj; θL¢
for all xHi , xLi ∈ Xi, xj ∈ Xj, θ ∈ Θ ( i = 1, 2, j 6= i) such that xHi > xLi ,
θH > θL.
(ii) πi is supermodular (SUP) if ∆i
¡
xHi , xLi ;xj; θ
¢
is weakly increasing in xj
for all xHi , xLi ∈ Xi, xj ∈ Xj, θ ∈ Θ ( i = 1, 2, j 6= i) such that xHi > xLi .
By (i), an increase in θ has the direct effect of weakly increasing the
incremental payoff for each player. Thus, for fixed behavior of the other
player, increasing own actions becomes weakly more attractive, so that reac-
tion functions are weakly increasing in θ.17 By (ii), the payoff increase from
increasing xi is non-decreasing in xj for j 6= i. Thus, the optimal response of
player i is weakly increasing in xj, that is, the game is a GSC. The positive
direct effects of higher θ on xi and the induced indirect effects on xj are
mutually reinforcing. Together, ID and SUP therefore suggest a (weakly)
positive effect of θ on actions. This leads to the main hypothesis:
Hypothesis (Structural Approach):When ID and SUP hold, the fre-
quency distribution of observed play for θH weakly dominates the correspond-
ing distribution for θL < θH according to first-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD).18
An important implicit assumption in this heuristic approach is that player
i’s beliefs about the direction in which xj changes with θ or xi are fully
determined by whether θ and xi increase or decrease incremental payoffs ∆j:
Positive effects on ∆j necessarily translate into expecting higher actions of
player j. While this appears to be a fairly weak constraint on beliefs, it is
still a constraint which may sometimes be implausible.19
17A formal version of this statement relies on Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
18In a finite game, this states that, as θ increases, the fraction of players choosing an
action up to and including any predetermined level of xi weakly decreases.
19See the example in Section 8.
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3.2 Experimental evidence
The first justification for such structure-based predictions is that they are
confirmed in many examples. As an illustration, take the Kreps game.
Straightforward derivations show that this game satisfies SUP and ID with
respect to the standard (total) orders onX1,X2 and θ.20 The structure-based
prediction is thus that for θH = 300 players tend to choose higher actions
than for θL = 0. This is precisely the observed outcome.21
This argument illustrates the central message of the paper: By ignoring
details of the game and focusing instead on basic structural properties, one
often obtains a weak prediction of treatment effects that is consistent with
the evidence. The structural approach is a powerful tool for explaining com-
parative statics puzzles. For instance, the same logic can be applied to five
other GH examples. Most immediately, the common-interest proposal game,
the related conflicting-interest proposal game22 and the extended coordina-
tion game also satisfy SUP and ID with respect to suitable parameters and
partial orders.23 In all three cases, like in the Kreps game, there are clear
treatment effects, even though the equilibrium set is independent of θ.
Two other GH games, the traveler’s dilemma and an auction game, are
not supermodular, but nevertheless GSC. To illustrate, consider the traveler’s
dilemma. The game is not supermodular, because∆i
¡
xLi + 1, xLi ;xj; θ
H¢ = 0
when xj ≤ xLi − 1, but ∆i
¡
xHi , xLi ;xj; θ
H¢ = θ < 0 when xj = xLi .24 Because
20As to ID, for both players, an increase in θ raises the benefit from choosing the highest
action (x1 = 1 and x2 = 3) rather than any other one, whereas there is no relation between
θ and the benefit for player 2 from increasing x2 from 0 to 1 or 2, or from 1 to 2. As to
SUP, for instance for player 1, the incremental payoffs increase from −200 to 10, 20 and
finally θ + 30 as player 2 increases his actions from 0 to 3.
21The overly strong independence prediction obtained by simple comparison of Nash
equilibria for different parameter values is a boundary case of the structure-based predic-
tion that the equilibrium is weakly increasing in θ.
22I use this term for the game described in Figure 4 of GH.
23Details of the arguments are available upon request.
24For all other constellations ∆i
³
xLi + 1, x
L
i ;xj ; θ
H
´
is independent or increasing in xj .
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ID still holds,25 a reduction in the transfer parameter R, or equivalently, an
increase in θ, increases incremental payoffs. Hence, even though θ has no
effect on the reaction function in the specific example, the game structure
suggests that player i’s reaction to xj is weakly increasing in θ.26 The trav-
eler’s dilemma corresponds to the boundary case where the reaction functions
are unaffected by the parameter change even though ID holds. Ignoring all
details of the game structure except ID and SC suggests that a parameter
increase has the direct effect of increasing actions for both players, and that
these effects are mutually reinforcing, so that actions should increase with θ,
as required by the structure-based prediction.
For later reference, note that in the two sequential games, the supermod-
ularity condition for player 2 is actually superfluous, because player 2 only
acts for x1 = 0: As θ increases, ID implies that the payoff increase of player
2 from higher actions increase. Because π1 is supermodular, this increases
the payoff increase for player 1 from higher choices.
Beyond the GH examples, many authors have investigated coordination
games, which can be addressed similarly. Consider an effort coordination
game with payoffs
πi (xi, xj; θ) = min (xi, xj) + θ · xi,
where xi ∈ {0, 1, ...,M} and θ = −c for some effort cost parameter c ∈ (0, 1).
For c < 1, the set of pure-strategy equilibria is the diagonal (x1 = x2).
Thus, if one uses the set of pure-strategy equilibria to predict responses to
parameter changes, increases in costs should have no effect on equilibrium
effort. The comparative statics become more counter-intuitive if one allows
for mixed-strategy equilibria. For instance, for Xi = {0, 1}, there is an equi-
librium such that each player chooses xi = 1 with probability c. Thus, as
25To see this, first note that, because of the termmin (xi, xj) in the payoff function, there
is an incentive to choose high actions. The term θ ·sign (xi − xj) acts as a counterbalance,
but less so as θ approaches zero from below. Therefore, the incremental payoff from
increasing xi is non-decreasing in θ.
26Again, Lemma 1 in the Appendix provides the formal justification of this argument.
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costs increase, agents put more weight on the high effort level, so that, para-
doxically, effort increases with costs. Unsurprisingly, experimental results
(van Huyck et al. 1990; Goeree and Holt 2005) show that for lower c more
subjects choose higher effort. The structural approach resolves the tension
between theoretical predictions and empirical observations. Effort coordina-
tion games are supermodular, because the net benefit from increasing effort
is 1− c > 0 if the original effort level is smaller than the effort of the other
player, and −c < 0 otherwise. Also, πi satisfies ID. Therefore, the structural
prediction is that actions are weakly increasing in θ.27
Another application concerns public goods experiments (e.g., Ledyard
1995). For example, a typical two-player version would have
πi (xi, xj; θ) = p (zi − xi) +
θ
2
2X
j=1
xj,
where zi, p and θ are positive constants and θ2 < p < θ, so that x1 = x2 =
0 is the only Nash equilibrium and is inefficient. Nevertheless, increases in
θ typically lead to higher choices.28 The games satisfy ID, and SUP holds
trivially because payoffs are additively separable.29
The very fact that the predictions of the structural approach are consis-
tent with the experimental evidence is a strong argument in its favor. In
27Several authors have analyzed the effects of changing various parameters in other 2×2-
coordination games satisfying (SUP) and (ID). For instance, in the experiments of Huettel
and Lockhead (2000), Schmidt et al. (2003), and most of the experiments of Guyer and
Rapoport (1972), the comparative-statics predictions correspond exactly to those obtained
from the structural approach, and the arguments are similar as in the following discussion
of effort coordination games. The propositions of this paper are not applicable for the
“Benefit-to-other”-treatment of Guyer and Rapoport, because (ID) does not hold.
28zi is the endowment of player i; xi is interpreted as a contribution to a public good;
higher θ corresponds to an increase in the return on investment in the public good.
29Another example is provided by the imperfect price competition game with inelastic
demand analyzed by Capra et al. (2002). In this game, subjects earn exactly the price
they set if it is the minimum of the two prices; otherwise they earn only a fraction. The
equilibrium is independent of the fraction, but observed play is increasing. The game can
be shown to satisfy (SUP) and (ID), so that the structural approach applies.
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addition, the intuition for this observation is straightforward. Even subjects
who, for whatever reason, do not display Nash behavior, are likely to under-
stand the two basic structural properties: (i) High incremental payoffs make
high actions attractive for given actions of the other player; (ii) incremental
payoffs increase with the other player’s action. If players understand these
two properties, and if they believe that other players do so, too, then they
should choose high actions for high parameter values.
Before turning to more precise justifications of the structural approach, I
note that a slight modification of the idea can be used to explain a seventh
GH example, the generalized matching pennies game, along similar lines,
even though it is not a GSC (See Appendix 2).30
As summarized in Table 2, the structural approach can thus explain the
evidence in seven of the ten examples provided by GH. In the remaining cases,
it does not provide a false prediction. It is simply not applicable because
the games do not have suitable structural properties. Loosely speaking, the
direct and indirect effects of parameter changes are not mutually reinforcing,
so that general comparative statics results cannot be derived.
4 Nash equilibria of perturbed games
Many approaches to explaining deviations from Nash equilibria rely on the
idea that actual payoffs differ from monetary payoffs, for instance, because
players have social preferences. Specifically, suppose that instead of the mon-
30In this example, with an appropriate order on strategy spaces, a higher parameter
increases the equilibrium action of one player, but leaves the action of the other player
constant; while observed actions of both players are affected. Any order on the strategy
space implies that the actions are SC for one player, but strategic substitutes (SS) for the
other one. However, because the parameter only affects one of the two payoff functions, an
intuitive structure-based prediction of treatment can be given even so, and this intuitive
prediction can be justified as in the GSC case.
13
Nash Prediction Game Observed Actions Reason
Unique pure Nash Traveler’s dilemma Increasing in θ SC +
equilibrium (Capra et al. 1999, GH) ID
independent of θ Public goods games SUP +
(Ledyard 1995) ID
Unique SPE Proposal games Increasing in θ SUP +
independent of θ (GH Fig. 3 and 4) ID
Unique mixed Matching pennies Player 2: increasing SC/SS
equilibrium: (Ochs 1995, GH) Player 1: decreasing ID
increasing in θ for
player 2, constant
for player 1
Unique Bayesian Auction game (GH) Increasing in θ SC +
Equilibrium ID
independent of θ
Multiple pure Kreps game (GH) Increasing in θ SUP +
equilibria; Extended coordination ID
mixed equilibrium game (GH)
is independent of θ
Multiple pure Nash Effort coordination Increasing in θ SUP +
equilibria where (Van Huyck et al. 1990, ID
mixed equilibrium is Goeree and Holt 2005)
decreasing in θ Wolf’s dilemma
(Huettel-Lockhead 2000)
Period-2 equilibrium Capacity game Period-2 actions SUP +
independent of (Brandts et al. 2003) increasing in own ID
first-period play period-1 action,
decreasing in
opponent’s.
Table 2: Summary of Results
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etary payoff functions πi, players have objective functions as follows:
bπi (xi, xj; θ) = πi (xi, xj; θ) + gi (xi, xj; θ) (2)
πi and bπi satisfy SUP and ID
Then we obtain:
Remark 1: If the game with payoff functions bπi as in (2) has a unique
Nash equilibrium before and after the parameter increase, this equilibrium is
weakly increasing in θ.
This is an immediate implication of a more general comparative statics
result of Milgrom and Roberts (1990). The intuition is similar to the one
given for the structural approach: As θ increases, the incremental benefits
from higher actions increase weakly for both players, and these effects are
mutually reinforcing. This is true for the perturbed as well as for the unper-
turbed objective functions.
Of course, to obtain point predictions and to show that the equilibrium
is strictly increasing, the perturbation would have to be specified. To under-
stand weak comparative statics, however, there is no need to do so. As long
as both actual payoffs bπi and monetary payoffs πi satisfy SUP and ID, the
weak comparative statics conclusions for πi translates to bπi. However, only
suitable perturbations guarantee that the equilibrium for bπi is increasing in
θ for suitable parameters, rather than merely non-decreasing.
To illustrate the idea, first consider the game with payoffs πi given by the
following matrix, where θ ∈ {0, 1}.
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 10, 10− 9θ 8 + θ, 8− 4θ
x1 = 1 8 + θ, 8− 4θ 7 + θ, 9− θ
Table 3: Payoffs in the Perturbed Effort Coordination Game Game
Clearly, πi satisfies ID and SUP, and the unique Nash equilibrium is (0, 0),
independent of θ. Now suppose players are altruistic, with payoff functions
15
πi + 0.5πj. It is straightforward to show that the perturbation gi = 0.5πj
satisfies SUP and ID for i = 1, 2; j 6= i, and that the equilibrium for the
game with payoff functions bπi = πi + 0.5πj is increasing in θ, namely (0, 0)
for θ = 0 and (1, 1) for θ = 1. Thus, while the structural approach predicts
weakly increasing actions both for the unperturbed and for the perturbed
game, actions are increasing only in the perturbed game.
Next, consider the common-interest proposal game (Figure 2). Sup-
pose that player 2 cares about the difference between his payoff and the
payoff of player 1. Thus, we introduce a perturbation term g2(x2, x1) =
k (π2(x2, x1)− π1(x1, x2)), k > 0. Hence, g2(0, 1) = g2(1, 1) = −30k; g2(0, 0) =
−20k; g2(1, 0) = k (θ − 10). Clearly, g2 satisfies ID and g1 ≡ 0 trivially sat-
isfies SUP. By the arguments in Section 3.2 for the sequential GH examples,
this is sufficient to apply the structural approach, which predicts that the
equilibria of the modified game are still weakly increasing in θ between 0 and
60. Direct calculation of the SPE of the modified game shows that player 2
chooses x2 = 1 if and only if θ ≥ 60−10k1+k . Hence, for k < 6, the best response
of player 2 jumps upwards at some critical level of θ. Anticipating this, player
1 chooses x1 = 1 if and only if θ ≥ 60−10k1+k . Thus, there is a positive effect of
suitable parameter changes on the equilibrium outcome.
5 The quantal response equilibrium
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) introduced by Mc Kelvey and Pal-
frey (1995) does not presuppose best responses; instead players can make
errors. Consider a finite game with strategy spaces Xi =
©
x0i , ..., x
Ni
i
ª
. De-
note the probabilities with which player i chooses action xi as pixi. Let
εi = (εi1, ..., εiNi) be a vector of perturbations for player i, drawn from a
joint density fi. Then, by assumption, player i chooses ν ∈ Xi if and only if
ν maximizes the sum of the expected payoff and the perturbation, that is,X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (ν, xj; θ) + εiν ≥
X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ) + εixi ∀xi 6= ν. (3)
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Using this condition, one immediately arrives at the stochastic best-response
function or quantal response function that assigns to each probability vector
pj for player j the probability vector pi = pi(pj; θ) of choices for player i
defined by the requirement that εi satisfies (3). A QRE requires that each
player’s own error distribution is consistent with stochastic best response.
The next comparative statics result shows that the similarity in the pre-
dictions of the structural approach and the QRE is not a coincidence.
Proposition 1 Suppose a finite game satisfies SUP and ID. Suppose that,
for a fixed error distribution, a unique QRE p(θ) = (p1(θ),p2(θ)) exists
for every θ. Then, an increase in θ shifts the equilibrium distribution p(θ) =
(p1(θ),p2(θ)) weakly according to first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD).31
Thus, a parameter increase in a game satisfying SUP and ID implies
that higher choices become more likely for the QRE. The intuition for the
result is quite similar to the intuition for Remark 1. As the parameter θ shifts
upwards, increasing differences imply that, for fixed behavior of the opponent,
players are more likely to respond with higher actions. Anticipating this, it
becomes even more attractive for both players to increase their actions.32
Again, the interesting aspect of Proposition 1 is not that the comparative
statics property holds for some QRE, but that it holds generally. Haile et al.
(2008) have argued that, because of the degrees of freedom in specifying the
error distributions, the QRE can explain any behavior in any given game.
Nevertheless, as the authors themselves point out, the QRE may still put re-
strictions on possible comparative statics under the invariance assumption.33
31The uniqueness property may not always be obvious to show, but uniqueness results
exist, for instance, for the logit equilibrium (e.g., Anderson et al. 2001).
32The underlying invariance assumption for the error distribution is also used by Haile
et al. (2008) and discussed there.
33In their Theorem 2, Haile et al. (2008) follow a different approach: They ask whether
the behavior observed ex-post is consistent with agents putting greater weight on actions
that, given the observed distribution of play, have become more attractive than others
after the parameter increase.
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Proposition 1 confirms this idea by giving comparative statics predictions
purely on the basis of structural properties that are known ex ante.
A final remark concerns the invariance of the error distribution. It is
clear that restrictions on beliefs are needed to generate the conclusion of
Proposition 1: If for some reason players expect a higher value of θ to induce
players to systematically make more errors where they choose low actions,
then the result will no longer hold.34 Conversely, however, if beliefs change in
such a way that players are expected to make more errors where they choose
high actions when θ increases, then the result should be reinforced.
6 Level-k reasoning
Next, we consider level-k reasoning. Let strategy spaces beXi =
©
x0i , ..., x
Ni
i
ª
.
Suppose that, for each player i ∈ {1, 2}, there are different types, so-called
level-k players, k = 1, ..., K, K ≤ ∞. Suppose player i is of level k with some
exogenous probability λki . Suppose further that all level-0 players choose
xi ∈ Xi randomly according to some exogenous distribution p0(xi, θ). Level-
k players choose xi ∈ Xi so as to maximize
X
xjXj
πi(xi, xj, θ)pk−1(xj; θ).35
Proposition 2 Suppose SUP and ID hold, and θ shifts p0i according to weak
FOSD. Then the expected action profile under level-k reasoning is weakly
increasing in θ in the FOSD-sense.
Usually, it is assumed that the actions of level-0 players are uniformly
distributed. Our result not only holds for arbitrary distributions that are
independent of θ, but even under the weaker condition that θ shifts the
distribution upwards in the FOSD-sense. Intuitively, as long as there is
no effect of θ on the distribution of level-0 players, level-1 players benefit
from choosing higher actions as θ increases, because the incremental payoff
34See the example at the end of Section 8.
35Level-k thinking was introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995); see
also Crawford (2007).
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is higher. If there is a positive effect of θ on the distribution of level-0 players,
supermodularity reinforces the effect. Hence, as θ increases, level-1 players
tend to choose higher actions. By inductive reasoning, higher level players
choose higher actions.
Summing up, as for the Nash equilibrium and the QRE, level-k reasoning
allows clear comparative statics predictions that are based only on ID and
SUP.
7 Equilibrium Selection
As I show in more detail in the working paper, the structural approach fits
nicely with selection criteria such as risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten
1988). There, I consider symmetric games with Xi = {0, 1} with pure-
strategy equilibria (0, 0) and (1, 1).36 I show that the comparative statics
implied by the structural approach and by risk dominance coincide: If ID
holds, risk dominance also tends to predict higher equilibria as θ increases.
This extends a similar result of Goeree and Holt (2005) for effort games.
An alternative approach to equilibrium selection that generalizes to games
with more than two players and continuous actions is available for potential
games (Monderer and Shapley 1996, Goeree and Holt 2005). Such games are
characterized by the existence of a potential V (x1, x2; θ) with the defining
property that π1 (x001, x2; θ)−π1 (x01, x2; θ) = V (x001, x2; θ)−V (x01, x2; θ) for all
x01, x001 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, θ ∈ Θ, and analogously for π2.37 Potential-maximizing
strategy profiles are pure-strategy equilibria, but the converse is not necessar-
ily true (Monderer and Shapley 1996): In games with multiple equilibria such
as effort coordination games, there is typically a unique potential-maximizing
profile which can be used for equilibrium selection. Monderer and Shapley
36(0, 0) is risk dominant if both players prefer 0 if they expect the other player to choose
0 and 1 with probability 1/2 each.
37With continuously differentiable games, this boils down to the requirement that the
partial derivatives of V with respect to each xi coincide with those of πi (xi, xj ; θ).
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(1996) have already argued that, in effort games, the observed effects of in-
creasing costs can be explained using potential maximization, showing that,
in the experiments of van Huyck et al. (1990), potential maximization se-
lects the lowest equilibrium for high effort costs and the highest equilibrium
for low effort costs. The working paper shows more generally that, when ID
holds, potential maximization tends to select higher equilibria.
Summing up, the structural approach yields comparative statics predic-
tions that are compatible with standard selection methods where they apply.
8 Conclusions
I have introduced a heuristic “structural” approach to predict treatment
effects when Nash equilibria are the same in the different treatments. The
resulting comparative statics predictions are supported by the experimental
observations in all cases that I am aware of, in particular, in the GH examples.
I have shown that the structural approach is consistent with the predictions
of the QRE, level-k thinking and equilibrium selection theories.
The paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it brings together
two literatures that rarely speak to each other, namely the experimental lit-
erature and the literature on monotone comparative statics in games with
strategic complementarities. Hopefully, this exercise contains potential for
further cross-fertilization.38 Second, the structural approach is more basic
than the alternative suggestions: Without imposing a particular story about
what subjects do for any given parameter value, it shows that structural prop-
erties of the game are useful to explain treatment effects. Third, I provide a
unified explanation of seven of the ten GH examples which, to my knowledge,
no other single approach does. Finally, though this was not detailed here, the
approach can be applied to problems that do not concern comparative statics
38A vaguely related experimental contribution of Chen and Gazzale (2004) demonstrates
that learning in certain games with strategic complementarities, namely supermodular
games, works particularly well. However, the authors do not treat comparative statics.
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directly. For instance, Brandts et al. (2007) consider a two-stage game of
capacity choice where the structural approach correctly predicts the effects
of (endogenous) capacity choices on second-period actions.39
In spite of the large number of conceivable applications, it is important
to recognize the limitations of the approach. First, obviously, it does not
provide point predictions. Second, there are examples where the direct and
indirect effects of parameter changes are not mutually reinforcing, so that no
comparative statics predictions are possible without relying on the concrete
specification. Third, I am convinced that cleverly designed experiments can
show that there are some GSC satisfying ID, for which the observed actions
are not increasing in the parameter. The challenge for future experimental
work is to discover under which circumstances such violations of the struc-
tural approach will occur. A suggestion in this direction is the following. For
θ ≥ 0, consider an asymmetric coordination game as follows:
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 5, 5 0, 0
x1 = 1 0, 0 5.1, 5.1 + θ
Table 4: Payoffs in the Perturbed Effort Coordination Game
Clearly, this parameterized game satisfies SUP and ID, so that the struc-
tural approach would predict (weakly) higher actions as θ increases. But it is
quite conceivable that, for large values of θ, players would avoid this action
and believe that others do so to, either because of inequity aversion or simply
because of the focal nature of the symmetric equilibrium.
39For details, I refer the reader to the working paper.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix 1: Proofs
The following well-known monotone comparative statics (Topkis 1978) result
will be helpful.
Lemma 1 Let f ((x, τ) be a real-valued function defined on X×T , where X
is a complete lattice and T is a partially ordered set. Suppose f satisfies in-
creasing differences with respect to (x, τ). Then g(τ) ≡ argmaxx∈X f ((x, τ)
is a weakly increasing correspondence.40
In the following applications, X will correspond to the strategy set of one
player; τ will be the strategy set of the other player or the parameter θ.
9.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 will be shown to be a simple corollary of the following result.
Lemma 2 Suppose πi (xi, xj; θ) satisfies SUP and ID. Then
(i) For fixed choice probabilities of the opponent, pj, an increase in θ shifts
the stochastic best response pi(pj; θ) according to FOSD.
(ii) The stochastic best response pi(pj; θ) is weakly increasing in pj.
Proof. (i) For ν ∈
©
x0i , ..., x
Ni
i
ª
, the probability that xi ≤ ν is chosen is
Pν(θ) = prob
⎛
⎝max
xi∈Xi
X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ) + εixi >
X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ) + εix0i
⎞
⎠
∀x0i > ν. (4)
By ID, X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ)−
X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ)
40g(τ) is weakly increasing if τL < τH implies min g(τL) ≤ min g(τH) and max g(τL)
≤ max g(τH) , where the inequalities on X refer to some arbitrary partial order.
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is weakly decreasing in θ for all x0i > ν. Because εix0i − εixi is independent of
θ by the invariance property, Pν(θ) is therefore weakly decreasing in θ.
(ii) Suppose r < s ∈
n
x0j , ..., x
Nj
j
o
. It suffices to show that replacing
any pj by pjε ≡
³
pj0, ...,pjr − ε, ...,pjs + ε, ...,pjnj
´
for ε ∈ (0,pjr] leads to an
FOSD-shift in pi. This will be true if Pν(θ) is weakly larger for ε = 0 than
for ε > 0 for all ν ∈ Xi. This holds, because SUP implies
X
xj∈Xj
pjεxjπi (xi, xj; θ)−
X
xj∈Xj
pjεxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ)−X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ) +
X
xj∈Xj
pjxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ) = (5)
ε (πi (xi, s; θ)− πi (x0i, s; θ)− πi (xi, r; θ) + πi (x0i, r; θ)) ≤ 0. (6)
To show that this implies Proposition 1, first note that, with FOSD as a
partial order, Pi the set of distributions onXi is a complete lattice (Echenique
2003, Lemma 1); this structure carries over to P = Pi × Pj. Further, by
Lemma 2, the stochastic best response correspondence shifts out as θ in-
creases. Denote the interval of probability vectors in P that are greater or
equal to some p as U(p). Since the best-response correspondence for θH > θL
is weakly increasing by part (ii) of the lemma, it maps U(p(θL)) into itself.
Its fixed point must therefore satisfy p(θH) ≥ p(θL).
9.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For k = 0, the result corresponds to the assumption that θ shifts p0i weakly
according to FOSD. Lemma 1 implies that, to complete the induction, it
suffices to show that
X
xjXj
πi(xi, xj, θ)pk−1(xj; θ), the expected payoff of a
level-k player who assumes that player j is level k − 1, satisfies increasing
difference in (xi; θ), provided the FOSD statement holds for level k − 1. ID
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(increasing differences for πi in (xi, θ)) impliesX
xjXj
¡
πi(xHi , xj, θ
H)− πi(xLi , xj, θH)
¢
pk−1(xj; θL) ≥ (7)X
xjXj
¡
πi(xHi , xj, θ
L)− πi(xLi , xj, θL)
¢
pk−1(xj; θL)
for θH ≥ θL. Because pk−1(xj; θ)) satisfies FOSD in θ, pk−1(xj; θH) can
be obtained from pk−1(xj; θL) by shifting mass ε ≥ 0 from some value x
n0j
j to
some x
n00j
j where n
00
j > n0j, and iterating this procedure finitely many times.
It thus suffices to show thatX
xjXj
¡
πi(xHi , xj, θ
H)− πi(xLi , xj, θH)
¢
pk−1(xj; θL)+ (8)³
πi(xHi , x
n00j
j , θ
H)− πi(xLi , x
n00j
j , θ
H)−
³
πi(xHi , x
n0j
j , θ
H)− πi(xLi , x
n0j
j , θ
H)
´´
ε ≥
(9)X
xjXj
¡
πi(xHi , xj, θ
H)− πi(xLi , xj, θH)
¢
pk−1(xj; θL)
This follows immediately from SUP.
9.2 Appendix 2: Generalized matching pennies
Even for asymmetric games that do not satisfy SC, the structural approach
is sometimes useful. A case in point is generalized matching pennies, with
Xi = {0, 1} and Θ = {44, 80, 320} and payoffs as in Table 5.
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 θ, 40 40, 80
x1 = 1 40, 80 80, 40
Table 5: Payoffs in the Generalized Matching Pennies Game
Identify a mixed strategy of player i, σi, with the probability of choosing
action 1. For all θ ∈ Θ = {44, 80, 320}, the reaction correspondence for
player 2 is given by the same dashed line R2 (σ1; θ) in Figure 3, while it
depends explicitly on θ for player 1. The unique mixed-strategy equilibrium
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10.5
0.091
0.5
0.875
1
2σ
1( )320;21 σR
( )80;21 σR
( )44;21 σR
( )θσ ;12R
1σ
Figure 3: Generalized Matching Pennies
is σ∗1 =
1
2
, σ∗2 = 1 − 40θ . Thus, unlike in the earlier examples, only player
1’s equilibrium action is independent of θ: Player 2’s choice x2 is increasing
in θ, as the probability with which x2 = 1 is played increases in θ. As θ
increases from 44 to 80 and 320, the percentage of subjects in the role of
player 1 choosing the high action decreases from 92% to 52% and then to
4%, whereas the corresponding values for player 2 increase from 20% to 52%
and then to 84%. Thus, contrary to the prediction of the mixed-strategy
equilibrium both players’ actions change as θ does.
To understand this, note that the game has the following properties:
(SUB2) π2 (x2, x1; θ) is submodular in (x2, x1).41
(DD1) π1 (x1, x2; θ) satisfies decreasing differences in (x1, θ).42
(IND2) π2 (x2, x1; θ) is independent of θ
Intuitively, by (DD1), a direct effect of the increase in θ is that player
1’s action should decrease. By SUB2, this makes player 2 want to increase
41This means that ∆2
¡
xH2 , xL2 ;x1; θ
¢
is weakly decreasing in x1.
42This means that ∆1
¡
xH1 , xL1 ;x2; θ
¢
is weakly decreasing in θ.
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his action. In the working paper, I provide a comparative statics result for
games with the structural properties of generalized matching pennies that
confirms these predictions for the Nash equilibrium.
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